The majority of judges on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have refused to consider an appeal by a man who argued that his 1992 Collin County trial was tainted because the judge and prosecutor in his case were having a secret romantic affair.
In dissent, Presiding Judge David J. Schenck wrote that the majority on the state’s highest criminal court sacrificed concerns about a fundamental breakdown in due process simply to seek finality in the long-standing appeals of a three-decade-old case.
Rodney James Dilworth, who is serving a 99-year sentence for attempted murder, had filed multiple habeas corpus applications. His latest request was denied in the 5-4 opinion.
In his most recent filing, Dilworth argued that his due process rights were violated because the district judge who presided over his trial had an extramarital relationship with the district attorney who prosecuted him — the affair became tied to a broader Collin County courthouse scandal litigated in the well-known capital case of Charles Dean Hood.
Reports and court records from that era detailed claims that then-judge Verla Sue Holland and then-prosecutor Thomas O’Connell had a relationship, a fact denied for years but later acknowledged under oath in depositions taken in connection with Hood’s case.
In that case, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that Hood should have raised the issue of the affair in earlier appeals, but he did not, and the delayed argument was insufficient to justify an entirely new trial.
The Court, however, ordered a new punishment trial for Hood on a legal point unrelated to the once-secret romantic relationship. Hood, who had been a death row inmate, pleaded guilty and agreed to a life sentence to settle his case.
Dissenting judges in Dilworth’s case argued that the court’s focus on finality should not automatically override a claim suggesting a fundamental breakdown in impartial adjudication — the type of claim that, if proven, could qualify as a structural due process violation.
The dissenters argued that even if the claim is filed late, the court should not dismiss it by invoking procedural doctrines such as the habeas “writ bar” and laches — an equitable doctrine that allows courts to deny relief due to an applicant’s unreasonable delays.
In his dissenting opinion, Schenck argued that the court should allow Dilworth to develop evidence supporting his claim that he was denied due process.
“It is also concerning that, despite ultimately granting a new trial in the Hood case, we would refuse to consider the due process rights of a similarly situated applicant in connection with a judgment that has continuing, direct operation,” Schenck said.
“Some complaints fit so plainly within the structural elements of a due process right to a fair trial that the failure to recognize them would undermine the ability of the judiciary to render judgments worthy of presumed public acceptance,” Schenck said.
“I instead would find Dilworth’s case and others like it involving ‘demonstrable judicial misconduct’ to ‘invite post-conviction correction despite finality interests that would otherwise preclude relief,”’ he added.
Judges Scott Walker, David Newell, and Jesse F. McClure, III, dissented, but did not sign the dissenting Schenck’s opinion.
Dilworth has filed nine applications for a writ of habeas corpus, and six of those pertain to the conviction for attempted murder. Each previously disposed of application has been dismissed or denied, according to court records.
Justice Gina Parker, joined by Judges Kevin Yeary and Lee Finley, stated that the majority opinion was “not an effort to avoid addressing the judicial-bias claim.”
They said Hood was granted a new punishment hearing, but “lost on his judicial-bias claim.” As a result, “Dilworth’s loss on that claim cannot by any stretch of the imagination be characterized as disparate treatment.”
Schenck, however, said the majority opinion avoids the merits of the appeal and “stretches the facts of that claim’s dismissal in order to support [the] conclusion [that] we have no business re-examining Dilworth’s claim today.”
In his 1992 trial, Dilworth was convicted of attempted murder and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, receiving sentences of 99 years and 60 years, respectively.
Schenck also stated that it was irrelevant how long the affair between the judge and the prosecutor lasted.
“As subsequent reports confirmed, the then-District Attorney of Collin County and Dilworth’s trial judge admitted to a sexual relationship during that timeframe, though its exact duration is unclear, and it is equally unclear the relationship continued before, during, or after Dilworth’s trial,” he said.
“Regardless,” he added, “questions as to the duration of the intimate relationship do not diminish the existence of it or the obvious potential for the finding of a due process violation that should be explored and resolved.”
Schenck argued that Dilworth should be given an opportunity to explain his delay in filing his latest request for relief.
“Given that thirty years have passed, others might struggle with the concept of whether and how in the last several decades Dilworth could have not presented this claim sooner,” he said.
“The answer to this question becomes more clear considering Dilworth’s incarceration, away from the news cycles, internet and without access to Westlaw or even this Court’s website to make himself immediately aware of ongoings in Hood’s case which translate to his.”
The case is State of Texas v. Dilforth, case no. 05-93-00265-CR.